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Abstract
This chapter explores how the economic model of individual behavior can be improved 
by incorporating a number of insights from  evolutionary theory and  complex systems 
theory. Insights from psychology, the neurosciences, and the behavioral strand of eco-
nomics may be better understood from an evolutionary and complexity perspective. 
It takes an integrated interdisciplinary approach to economic phenomena. Core con-
cepts in economic theory ( preference and  choice) are clarifi ed and Tinbergen’s “four 
questions” about the origins of behavior are used to provide a framework. Informed 
by Tinbergen, areas from behavioral science are presented which may be useful for 
understanding economic behavior: some are directly evolutionary, while others come 
from scientifi c contexts informed by evolutionary theory. Each area has yielded well-
researched ideas that provide considerable insight into human nature. It concludes with 
a review of where research stands today and where it could be directed in the future.
Introduction
What kind of modifi cation of the economic theory of  individual decision mak-
ing do we need, and why? We began this project with a belief that the economic 
model of individual behavior can be improved by incorporating a number of 
insights from evolutionary theory and complex systems theory. This includes, 
but is not restricted to, grounding individual behavior in more psychologi-
cally and socially informed  decision making, along lines already followed in 
experimental and  behavioral economics. Our view, however, is that insights 
newly gained from psychology, the neurosciences, and the behavioral strand 
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of economics may be better understood from an evolutionary and complexity 
perspective.
Why do we think this is important? The fundamental reason is that it is one 
thing to understand what determines certain small-scale choices and to make, 
if possible, accurate predictions for specifi c policy purposes, for example, but 
it is quite another to map out the long-term causes and consequences (evolu-
tion) and connections (complexity) of human behavior in the context of their 
social and natural environment. Only such a comprehensive understanding 
will enable us to say whether human beings, and our collective behavior, are 
on a constructive or a disastrous trajectory.
In our group, we generally agreed that human behavior has, in some sense, 
lost contact with the natural and ecological constraints that shape it. Some 
members of the group, however, went further and took the view that this creates 
a dangerous situation for the  sustainability of the planet. If, as these members 
argue, the “house is on fi re,” then insights from evolutionary and complexity 
theory should help us understand, for example, which motivations propel us 
toward consumption behavior that adds fuel to those fl ames. Now more than 
ever, economists accustomed to modeling social phenomena, and with them 
other scientists from an array of disciplines (e.g., anthropology, archeology, bi-
ology, history, sociology, philosophy, and psychology), are challenged to take 
up the unique opportunity to contribute collectively to a broader understanding 
of those phenomena in an effort to make human life on this planet sustainable. 
It goes without saying that such interdisciplinary cooperation should also be 
applied to other pressing social phenomena, such as the rise and spread of 
fundamentalism and, possibly connected with this, the consequences and rem-
edies of social imbalances due to growing  inequalities in wealth and access to 
resources, as well as the need for cultural integration and education.
This chapter is structured as follows. As with all interdisciplinary research, 
its success depends on a common understanding of the main concepts used. 
Since the aim of this Forum was to take an integrated interdisciplinary ap-
proach to economic phenomena, the concepts that most need clarifi cation are 
those that lie at the heart of economic theory: preference and choice. Thus, we 
begin with a brief discussion of these concepts before turning to  Tinbergen’s 
“four questions” about the origins of behavior (Tinbergen 1963). Informed by 
Tinbergen, we structure a list of ideas from behavioral science that may be 
useful for understanding economic behavior: some of these are directly evolu-
tionary, while others come from scientifi c contexts that are informed by evolu-
tionary theory. Each of the areas described has yielded well-researched ideas 
that can give considerable insight into human nature (though it certainly does 
not capture them all). From there we review where we are today and where 
we might want to direct research in the future. The creation of an evolution-
ary behavioral economics will take many years as well as the concerted effort 
of many scholars. Thus our discussion necessarily takes an aspirational view.
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Preference, Choice, and Decision Making
A widely used textbook (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) describes the mainstream 
or standard economic model as it was developed originally by Léon Walras, 
Vilfredo Pareto, John Hicks, Paul Samuelson, Milton Friedman, and others, 
including Leonard Savage. This standard model generally consists of two pos-
sible approaches to  individual decision making: one based on preferences, the 
other on choice. The creators of this model did not intend for the model to be 
a perfect refl ection of human nature. For example, the transitivity assump-
tion assumes there are no cycles in preferences; however, in some circum-
stances, people do express preferences with cycles. Their motive was practical 
in nature: the standard model created a mathematical simplifi cation which (as 
developed later by Abraham Wald and Gérard Debreu) yields tremendous ana-
lytic power.
The preference-based approach starts with the assumption that a decision 
maker has given, stable preferences that are complete and transitive and, on 
this basis, studies the behavior which follows. Completeness means that the 
decision maker is able to compare any two alternatives. “It takes work and 
serious refl ection to fi nd out one’s own preferences. The completeness axiom 
says that this task has taken place: our decision makers make only meditated 
choices” (Mas-Colell et al. 1995:6). Transitivity rules out the possibility that a 
sequence of pairwise choices would lead to a cycle. Obviously, Mas-Colell et 
al. realize that cycles are possible, because they admit that “[s]ubstantial por-
tions of economic theory would not survive if economic agents could not be 
assumed to have transitive preferences” (Mas-Colell et al. 1995:7).1
As it happens, if preferences are complete and transitive (i.e., rational 
according to Mas-Colell et al. 1995) and satisfy continuity, then they can 
be represented in terms of a continuous utility function. Given constraints, 
the decision maker is then assumed to optimize or maximize this utility 
function, which means that she is assumed to choose the best available op-
tion out of her affordable opportunity set. Thus, the utility function and the 
preferences they capture lie at the heart of the preference-based approach to 
decision making.
In contrast with this preference approach, the choice-based approach takes 
choices as the primitive feature and imposes a structure on them in terms of a 
consistency axiom, such as the  weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP). 
This implies that if alternative x has been chosen when alternative y was also 
available, then there is no situation (or no other budget set) in which y is chosen 
1 Mas-Colell et al. do not defi ne preferences explicitly, but they seem to take them as “feelings 
of goodness.” This becomes clear in the following sentence, which describes intransitivity or 
a cycle in pairwise choices: “for example, feeling that an apple is at least as good as a banana 
and that a banana is at least as good as an orange, but then also preferring an orange over an 
apple” (Mas-Colell et al. 1995:7).
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and x is not. Stated otherwise, in such a case, x is revealed preferred to y.2 The 
choice-based approach “leaves room, in principle, for more general forms of 
behavior than is possible with the preference-based approach” (Mas-Colell et 
al. 1995:5). This means that assumptions do not need to be made about the 
reasons or motives for which the decision maker would choose x over y; no 
introspection is necessary; all that is required is that the decision maker acts 
consistently. This also implies that revealed preferences do not need to be pref-
erences at all, as the reasons for choice may be, in principle, based on some-
thing other than the decision maker’s own tastes or feelings of goodness. As it 
turns out, however, there are certain conditions under which revealed prefer-
ences are preferences and vice versa (Houthakker 1950; Uzawa 1960); that is, 
complete and transitive preferences generate a choice structure that satisfi es 
the weak axiom, and a choice structure that satisfi es the weak axiom (provided 
that enough subsets and choices are available) leads to a rational preference 
ordering that rationalizes the choices relative to the set of budget sets. Under 
these conditions, therefore, “[p]references explain behavior; we can interpret 
the decision maker’s choices as if she were a preference maximizer” (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995; italics added).
So, choices can be explained by preferences after all. It is for this reason 
that most economists take choices to be largely equivalent to preferences, even 
though underlying choices need not be derived from preferences at all, but 
may occur for other reasons. Although the choice-based approach is preferred 
by most economists, because “it makes clear that the theory of individual  deci-
sion making need not be based on a process of introspection but can be given 
an entirely behavioral foundation” (Mas-Colell et al. 1995:5), this equiva-
lence explains the persistence of the preference-based approach. Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green themselves write that “[t]his preference-based approach 
is the more traditional of the two, and it is the one that we emphasize” (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995:5). It is also a basis of  as-if reasoning so widespread in eco-
nomics. However, two words of caution are required here. First, Mas-Colell et 
al.’s statement that the decision maker’s choices can be seen as if she were a 
preference maximizer is, strictly speaking, too strong. Here, as if refers to the 
fact that consistent choices can be seen as being rationalizable by an underly-
ing rational preference ordering. Choosing the best available alternative is an 
2  WARP is a suffi cient but not necessary condition to fi nd a preference ordering that rational-
izes the choice data as backward. As far as textbook economics is concerned, a suffi cient and 
necessary condition is SARP (S for strong) or more generally GARP (G for generalized). How-
ever, those axioms rely on “indirectly revealed preferred” choices, that is, on choices which 
may, strictly speaking, not have been observed (the core idea of revealed preference theory) 
but they help to generate empirically useful data. In fact, Mas-Colell et al. (1995:91) men-
tion that the choice-based theory of demand is essentially equivalent to the preference-based 
theory as SARP imposes transitivity on observed behavior from the outset. This is of course 
a particular weakness of the choice-based approach: it is one thing to assume transitivity of 
preferences, but one cannot strictly speaking, impose transitivity on observed choices. See also 
Wong (2006).
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additional assumption about the choice rule of the decision maker, which is not 
always spelled out clearly in economic textbooks. It goes without saying that 
there could, in principle, be other choice rules, but maximization is the one 
favored by most economists.3 Second, a more general interpretation of  as-if 
reasoning exists in economics, based on Milton Friedman’s version, which has 
nothing to do with consistent choices but instead refers to the assumption of 
optimization. Friedman famously stated that the choice rules in decision pro-
cesses do not need to be descriptively realistic. Even though business people 
would probably state that they price at average cost with deviations when mar-
kets make it necessary, their decisions can legitimately be represented “as if 
they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns (generally if 
misleadingly called “profi ts”) and had full knowledge of the data needed to 
succeed in this attempt” (Friedman 1953:21).
Economic models that begin with a given utility function and the assump-
tion of  optimization do not clarify whether the utility function is appropriate 
because the underlying behavior is consistent (the as-if assumption in the sense 
of assuming that choices are made as if they derived from preferences), or 
whether utility maximization is taken to be a model detached from realistic 
assumptions but still capable of making useful predictions, including at the 
aggregate level (the as-if assumption in Friedman’s sense). This is certainly 
confusing and can be unhelpful in an interdisciplinary context. Indeed, many 
within our group were uneasy with the as-if approach, especially Friedman’s 
version of it. The relationship between models, their assumptions, and the con-
clusions drawn from them is an important methodological issue that needs to 
be clarifi ed. In particular, the conclusion that Friedman reached—that models 
based on heavily simplifi ed assumptions about individual choice will make 
adequate predictions in the aggregate—needs to be reviewed, as we have a 
great deal more information about individual choice, and much better ways of 
studying it, than was available in 1953 (cf. Wilson 2012).
Equally, the assumption of given and stable preferences needs to be re-
considered, as well as the idea of consistent choices. In any case, it needs to 
be clarifi ed, in much more detail, under which conditions typical economic 
textbook assumptions do hold, and when it would be better to turn toward a 
new theory(ies) of behavior and choice, and how behavior changes with mo-
tivations, depending on the context and institutions that frame those choices. 
Especially experimental, behavioral, and  neuroeconomics but also other fi elds 
such as anthropology and animal studies can help, together with appropriate 
methodological and epistemological refl ections, make economics become an 
interdisciplinary fi eld of study fi rmly engrained within the social sciences, 
such as it should be in the eyes of many members or our group.
3 Hausman (2011) calls this additional assumption the axiom of “choice determination.”
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Evolutionary Concepts That Might Improve Economics
To further the debate about the model of individual choice needed to construct 
realistic and valid models of the economy, our discussion focused on specifi c 
factors that infl uence, determine, and contribute to economic decision mak-
ing, and the means by which they are currently investigated. In a sense, this 
approach creates a toolbox for the research required to construct a complex, 
evolutionary account of economic phenomena. Although we have attempted to 
include as many aspects as possible, the toolbox refl ects our own research foci 
and experience and is incomplete. Thus, we encourage others to look beyond 
conventional economic research questions, models, and methodologies and to 
take the tools we suggest on board for a better understanding of human behav-
ior and its infl uence on its ecology and vice versa.
Tinbergen’s Four Questions
The ethologist Niko Tinbergen (1963) argued that  a full understanding of any 
behavior requires us to be able to answer four questions. For convenience, we 
have reordered them here:
1. Causation: what is the mechanism underlying the behavior? This refers 
both to the immediate stimulus and motivational situation eliciting the 
behavior, and to the physiological processes (neural, hormonal, muscu-
lar) that enable it to occur.
2.  Ontogeny: what past events in the life of the organism have contributed 
to the behavior occurring? Of particular concern here are developmen-
tal considerations; a person’s economic behavior can be profoundly in-
fl uenced by experiences they had during childhood, or before some key 
transition such as migration.
3. Evolution,  by which Tinbergen means evolutionary history: to what 
extent is the behavior a function of what sort of animal the organism is? 
Phylogenetically, among animals humans are vertebrates, among ver-
tebrates we are mammals, and among mammals we are great apes. At 
least some of our economic behavior may be best understood in terms 
of our vertebrate, mammalian or ape heritage.
4.  Survival value: how does the behavior contribute to the organism’s ca-
pacity to survive as an individual and pass on its genes to successive 
generations? In the modern context, with an understanding of  gene–
culture evolution and multilevel selection, we need also to consider 
how the behavior may contribute to the passing on of ideas within a 
culture and the survival of the economic group.
These questions have been used to help organize knowledge about many dif-
ferent kinds of behavior, including economic behavior (Wilson and Gowdy 
2013). The fi rst two questions ask for a proximate explanation of behavior 
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(how does behavior occur); the second two for an ultimate explanation (why 
does the behavior occur). We turn fi rst to research areas that may help evolu-
tionary behavioral economics provide a proximate explanation for economic 
behavior, and then to those that may help it provide an ultimate explanation. 
However, such a classifi cation is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, because the 
crucial point of Tinbergen’s argument is that all four kinds of explanation are 
needed and that they are inevitably intertwined.
Money as a Special Type of Economic Good
To give a preliminary fl avor of how Tinbergen’s approach works in practice, 
we consider here how it might apply to one particular economic phenomenon: 
 money. Before starting the analysis, however, we need to ask why we should 
consider money as something that an evolutionary account of economic behav-
ior needs to take into account. Although all modern economies use and indeed 
depend upon money, it is quite possible in principle to have an economy that 
does not. Except for the specifi c study of fi nancial fi rms and their products, 
money tends to disappear from economic analysis; it is just often summarized 
as medium of exchange, a measure of value, a standard, and a store of value, 
but not an economic product in itself.
The major reason that an empirically grounded economics needs to deal 
specifi cally with money is that, empirically, ordinary consumers and  fi rms 
do not always behave toward money in the way of conventional economic 
thinking, or the standard “theory of money” (Friedman 1994; Friedman and 
Schwartz 1982; Lucas 1972; Mises 1981) presupposes. That does not neces-
sarily mean that people’s real behavior toward money could not in principle 
be captured within a conventional  general equilibrium model; it means that 
if, for other reasons, we are moving to a complexity/evolutionary approach to 
economic modeling, we need to incorporate accurate empirical information 
about behavior toward money—or, at least, we need to be in a position to test 
whether the model is sensitive to the difference between assumed and actual 
behavior.
So in what sense is behavior toward money anomalous? Lea and Webley 
(2006) argue that, psychologically or biologically, a major puzzle is that mon-
ey is too strong an incentive. Behavior toward it resembles behavior toward 
incentives that have strong and obvious roots in biological needs (whether for 
the survival of the individual or for reproduction), that go down through our 
entire vertebrate heritage. It does not resemble our behavior toward objects 
that are merely means to a biological end. Lea and Webley argue that money 
is too recent an invention for there to have been any genetic adaptation to its 
existence. More recent accounts of  gene–culture coevolution, which show that 
the oft-cited evolution of lactose tolerance is just one example of hundreds 
that operate over relatively short timescales (Laland et al. 2010), give us some 
cause for pause about that argument. However, we can continue to rely on the 
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“stylized fact” (deduced from the history of European exploration and coloni-
zation of regions where no money was used) that people with no experience 
of money adapt to it very quickly when a money economy begins to exist in 
their region, and certainly their children have no problems with it. It would be 
good, however, to have real historical/anthropological data on how far this is 
true. Furthermore, there are behaviors toward money that are not explicable on 
the standard economic account, which is that money is valued and understood 
solely in terms of what it can buy. Lea and Webley (2006) explored these issues 
at length and coined the metaphor “money as drug” to capture these various 
phenomena (though they acknowledge that some of them fi t the drug metaphor 
better than others).
An example of these noninstrumental aspects of behavior toward money, 
and one that links with other issues raised in this report, is the widespread 
existence of social  norms about the use of money as a gift. The nature of these 
norms varies between times and cultures, but they are common. Their signifi -
cance can be seen in the literature on Christmas giving. It can be estimated 
that there is an annual loss of utility equivalent to around 5 billion USD in 
the U.S. economy, because people insist on giving specifi c gifts at Christmas, 
rather than giving money, which the recipients could spend on whatever they 
wanted—the so-called deadweight cost of Christmas (Waldfogel 1993, 2002). 
Of course, we can all think up reasons why this behavior might occur (e.g., 
Ellingsen and Johannesson 2011), because we live in the kind of society that 
has this kind of social norm, but that is not the point. Explicably or otherwise, 
utility is still lost.
So how does human behavior toward money look from the perspective of 
Tinbergen’s four questions?
1. In terms of mechanism, it is clear that for humans, money functions 
as a reinforcer in the Skinnerian sense, and that the brain mechanisms 
underlying its incentive effects cannot be distinguished from those 
underlying the effects of obviously biological reinforcers (Levy and 
Glimcher 2012).
2. In terms of development, it is equally clear that behavior toward money 
is something that is generally learned during childhood (although as 
noted, adults can be introduced to money), and indeed we have quite 
a lot of information about how that learning progresses in a modern 
developed economy (for a brief summary, see Webley et al. 2001:34). 
Obviously the development of a concept of money depends on the de-
velopment of cognition more generally, both in regard to number and 
other mathematical concepts, and also in regard to social life. It also 
depends on an understanding of the particular society one lives in, so it 
looks very different in less Westernized societies (see, e.g., Bonn and 
Webley 2000) than in a fully modern economy.
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3. In terms of its phylogenetic history, money as we know it is obviously 
an exclusively human phenomenon, but some possible antecedents can 
be seen in nonhuman primates, where physical tokens that look dis-
tinctly like coinage can be used extensively as rewards (e.g., Parrish et 
al. 2013). That is not to say that money can be understood as a token 
reinforcement in the Skinnerian sense; the realities of other animals’ 
behavior toward tokens rule that account (Lea and Midgley 1989).
4. As for the adaptive function of money, that is the nub of the argument 
that Lea and Webley (2006) were making about its tool and drug prop-
erties. Where money can properly be seen as a tool, its adaptive func-
tion is readily understood. Where it has to be seen as a drug, behavior 
toward it is quite likely to be maladaptive, perhaps representing an ex-
ample of what, below, we call a “ mismatch” between our evolutionary 
heritage and our current environment.
Regard for Others
Human  morality can be expressed through the  rational actor model and vali-
dated by experimental and  behavioral game theory. Human morality is a ratio-
nal system that involves making personally costly choices to promote ethical 
goals. People not only balance self-regarding against moral concerns, they also 
face confl icting moral principles in making choices.
Human actors exhibit three types of motives:  self-regarding,  other-regard-
ing, and  universalist. Self-regarding motives include seeking wealth, con-
sumption, leisure, social reputation, status, esteem, and other markers of per-
sonal advantage. Other-regarding motives involve a concern for fairness and 
a compassionate interest in the  well-being of others. Universalist motives are 
those that are followed for their own sake rather than directly for their effects. 
Among these universalist goals, which we term  character virtues, are  honesty, 
loyalty, courage, trustworthiness, and considerateness. Of course, universalist 
goals normally have consequences for those with whom one interacts, and for 
society as a whole. But one undertakes universalist actions for their own sake, 
beyond any consideration of their effects.
Humans evolved in  hunter-gatherer societies, consisting of a dozen fami-
lies or so (Kelly 1995) in which political life was an intimate part of daily 
life, involving the sorts of self-regarding, other-regarding, and universalis-
tic motivations described above. In particular, political activity was strongly 
consequentialist: a single individual could expect to make a difference to the 
outcome of a deliberation, a confl ict, or a collaboration, so that our political 
morality developed intimately entwined with material interests and everyday 
consequentialist moral (Boehm 2009).
As we move from small-scale hunter-gatherer societies to modern mass 
societies with millions of members, the public sphere passes from being inti-
mately embedded in daily life to being a largely detached institutional arena, 
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governed by complex institutions controlled by a small set of individuals, and 
over which most members have,  at best, formal infl uence through the ballot 
box and, at worst, no formal infl uence whatever. Political activity in modern 
societies is thus predominately non-consequentialist, meaning that individuals 
do not base their choices on the effect of their actions on political outcomes. 
Except for a small minority of individuals contesting for personal power, the 
political choices of a single citizen affect public sphere outcomes with a proba-
bility very close to zero—suffi ciently close that these choices cannot be attrib-
uted to consequentialist motives, whether  self-regarding,  other-regarding, or 
 universalist. This gives rise to the following typology of human action (Table 
8.1; see also Gintis, this volume):
Homo economicus is the venerable  rational selfi sh maximizer of traditional 
economic theory. H. socialis is the other-regarding agent who cares about fair-
ness,  reciprocity, and the  well-being of others. H.  moralis is the Aristotelian 
bearer of non-consequentialist  character virtues. The new types of public per-
sona are H. autisticus, who behaves politically just as H. economicus does 
privately, while H. parochialis votes and engages in collective action on behalf 
of the narrow interests of the demographic, ethnic, and/or  social status groups 
with which he identifi es. Finally, H. universalis acts politically to achieve what 
he considers the best state for the larger society, for instance, refl ecting John 
Rawls’s (1971) veil of ignorance, John Harsanyi’s (1977) criterion of univer-
sality, or John Roemer’s (2010) Kantian equilibrium.
Norms
Norms govern social interaction and can easily be discussed within the lan-
guage of  institutions. Crawford and  Ostrom offer a simple syntax of institu-
tions containing the elements T, A, E, D, C, where T specifi es the target group, 
A indicates a range of actions, E indicates the target environment, D is a de-
ontic conditional permissive, prohibitive, or necessary, and C is a range of 
consequences. Institutional statements of the form [T, A, E] are called “shared 
strategies” which can arise from equilibrium behavior and are self-enforced 
(Crawford and Ostrom 1995). Statements of the form [T, A, E, D] are called 
norms and require decentralized enforcement. Statements of the form [T, A, 
E, D, C] are called rules and require centralized enforcement. Theoretically, 
these statements and the mechanisms/institutions that support them function to 
minimize the cost of social interaction.
Table 8.1 Typology of human action.
Personal Social Universal
Private persona  Homo economicus  Homo socialis  Homo vertus
Public persona  Homo autisticus  Homo parochialis  Homo universalis
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Two classes of models regarding the effects of norms are used in econom-
ics. The fi rst looks at how norms constrain the opportunity set of individuals; 
the second looks at how norms change the conditional payoffs to individu-
als thus incentivizing them to align their goal with some external (group or 
leader’s) goal. A third possibility, discussed by Adam Smith in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, introduces the “the impartial spectator.” An oversimplifi ca-
tion is that the  impartial spectator serves as an internalized mechanism which 
tells an individual whether or not a particular (action, outcome) pair is accept-
able. The impartial spectator may reduce the number of institutional statements 
that include a deontic or consequence, but clearly does not eliminate them.
The role of the impartial spectator is a complex one in human  decision 
making. The neuroscience models of human behavior assume that the brain 
can produce subjective values and then use these  values to guide a process of 
learning the optimal choice. In general, this amounts to the problem of solving 
a time inconsistent stochastic dynamic programming problem that involves all 
of the decision-making events, both anticipated and unanticipated, during an 
individual’s lifetime.
Using Bellman’s principle of optimality, we could imagine each decision 
event as being decomposed into an immediate expected payoff of an action 
and a discounted future expected value of the optimal program given the action 
was taken. One might suspect the diffi cult problem is to compute this future 
value. The role of Smith’s impartial spectator may be to select among simpli-
fi ed variations of future expected value functions that maintain the  inclusive 
 fi tness of the individual. In such a model, norms may be used to assist in this 
selection process. In the extreme, imagine an individual facing a prohibitive 
norm over some action choosing to make the expected future value of choosing 
the action zero. If this reasoning is correct then an interesting research agenda 
is to understand how shared strategies, norms, and rules affect the form of the 
expected future value function and when does it lead to more consistent deci-
sion making over time.
Social Learning/Cultural Evolution
In the standard model of rational choice discussed above, preferences are as-
sumed to be exogenous. When making sense of the choices of an individu-
al at a given snapshot in time, this is perfectly reasonable, but preferences 
change across time and space.  Cultural evolutionary theory (Richerson and 
Boyd 2005) represents one way to model preference dynamics while address-
ing Tinbergen’s four questions for understanding behavior. Culture, defi ned as 
beliefs and behaviors infl uenced by  social  learning, evolved to allow humans 
to adapt rapidly to their ecology ( survival value). The act of learning from oth-
ers is conceptualized through social learning strategies which “bias” the way 
individuals learn from others throughout their life (causation and  ontogeny). 
Prestige bias, success bias, frequency-dependent biases, and ethnic marking 
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are strategies that have been shown to be theoretically salient in the adop-
tion of beliefs and behaviors (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 
1998; Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Nakahashi et al. 2012), and that have re-
ceived support experimentally (Efferson et al. 2008a, b; McElreath et al. 2008; 
Chudek et al. 2012). Building economic models with preferences informed by 
social learning strategies can help us think about economies as complex adap-
tive systems (e.g., Bell 2013). We give an example of how this might work 
by considering the dynamics of how social norms are formed or affected by 
migration and ethnic group formation. 
As the formation of preferences through social learning occurs within the 
context of a group, how individuals join and form ethnic groups become obvi-
ous determining factors. Notably, some ascribe the formation of ethnic groups, 
and by extension the preferences formed within them, as having essentially 
to do with the details of the migration process. Migration rates, migrant age 
distribution, and the characteristics of the host community appear infl uential 
in real cases (Charsley 1974; Wallman 1986; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). A 
prominent feature of modern migrant groups, and multiethnic groups gener-
ally, are external and visible markers of group membership, termed ethnic 
markers (Barth 1969). There is evidence that ethnic markers are a possible 
salient feature in premodern groups as well (Hodder 1977). In a laboratory 
setting, ethnic markers have also been shown to evolve (Efferson et al. 2008a, 
b), following cultural evolutionary predictions that ethnic marking can evolve 
under a wide range of coordination benefi ts (McElreath et al. 2003). These 
fi ndings corroborate ethnographic accounts that document the formation of 
ethnic groups without any apparent political benefi t to do so (Charsley 1974). 
Thus, weak benefi ts to an ethnic identity may be suffi cient to maintain separate 
group identities within a larger population.
Work on the origin of group ascriptions and transnationalism further high-
lights the fl exibility of group membership (e.g., Lee 2009; Moya and Scelza 
2015). This suggests preferences to be highly fl exible also, mapping onto 
group membership. Perhaps even more intriguing is the empirical observation 
that new groups, norms, and hence preferences may be formed through 1+ gen-
eration immigrants who mix aspects of the originating and host populations, 
which is clearly seen linguistically through the generation of mixed languages, 
pidgins, and creoles (Thomason 2001). This process of novel group formation 
and possible expansion through  group selection (Boyd and Richerson 1990) 
adds dimensions of study which lead toward a complex systems approach to 
group membership and preference emergence.
The formation of ethnic markers, adoption of group preferences, and migra-
tion itself are all fundamentally shaped by social learning. However, the spe-
cifi c social learning strategies used by individuals (e.g.,  conformity or prestige 
bias) are hypotheses and are best used to form competing economic models 
and tested against data. Finally, there is an added benefi t for taking this cultural 
evolutionary perspective. Given the empirical-theoretical feedback between 
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cultural evolutionary models and anthropology, cultural evolution provides a 
natural way to incorporate anthropological insights into economic models.
Learning/Beliefs
Over the course of the last several decades, psychologists, neurobiologists, and 
other students of animal behavior have made great strides in understanding 
the mechanisms by which animals  learn the  values of their actions. From the 
point of view of economics, these kinds of learning take two forms: learning 
about one’s own preferences and learning (or building) one’s beliefs about the 
environment.
Consider an animal that encounters a new food which it has never before 
tasted. It samples that food repeatedly and in various quantities, learning by 
trial and error the desirability of that food. From the point of view of an econo-
mist, this can be seen as the animal learning how much it desires that food, 
what an economist might call preference learning. Consider next an animal 
learning by trial and error how likely it is to gain a reward by a certain action 
or learning how likely it is to outcompete another specifi c animal in some kind 
of competitive interaction. Both of these are what an economist would call 
examples of  belief learning.
Interestingly, psychologists and neuroscientists do not generally distinguish 
between these two kinds of learning. They generally bundle them together in 
their mechanistic study of learning. Perhaps even more interesting is the obser-
vation that (at least in animals) the brain areas associated with learning, which 
have been most heavily studied, does not distinguish between these two classes 
of learning. (Without doubt, other brain areas do make these distinctions, al-
though little is known about this.)
Studies over the last few decades have, however, led to the development of a 
simple taxonomy of learning mechanisms. It appears that the mammalian brain 
employs a number of different discrete complementary mechanisms for learn-
ing—whether learning about beliefs or about preferences. Speaking broadly, 
the most well-studied of the learning mechanisms fall into four categories: 
 model-free reinforcement  learning, model-based reinforcement learning,  habit 
learning, and  declarative  learning (which can be broken into two differentiable 
categories: episodic and semantic). One important side note is that while all 
of these mechanisms can infl uence behavior of the most subtle and delibera-
tive kinds, not all are accessible by verbal inquiry. While subjects often, for 
example, use model-free reinforcement-learning mechanisms when engaged 
in repeated strategic games, they often cannot verbally report the values gen-
erated by these systems with the same precision that their behavior accesses.
The best studied of these is the reinforcement-learning mechanism (Bush 
and Mosteller 1955; Wagner and Rescorla 1972), which is described in some 
detail by Glimcher (this volume) and is often referred to as the model-free 
learning system (see also Daw 2013; Daw and Tobler 2013). Briefl y, this 
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mechanism employs the neurotransmitter dopamine to recursively compute 
the value of a given stimulus or action from repeated samples. It can be thought 
of as developing a time-weighted average of experienced rewards and punish-
ments to derive an expectation. Because it accomplishes this using a recursive 
algorithm, the single-valued product of the learning process cannot be inverted 
to separate utility and probability—even if those two elements contribute very 
differently to the expectation that guides behavior. This system is localized 
to a set of brain regions in the  basal ganglia and  frontal cortex. One great 
limitation of this system is that it can handle only fi rst-order representations of 
the external world. It is thus exceedingly diffi cult for this system to represent 
the values of higher-order contingent structures in the external or behavioral 
space. Nonetheless, there are many simple situations in which this module can 
approximate  Bayesian learning (Sutton and Barto 1981).
Model-based  reinforcement  learning, associated with the frontal cortex and 
 hippocampus, appears optimized to learn higher-order conditional structures. 
For example, learning the value of a two-move sequence, where signifi cant 
contingent structure relates the two moves to rewards, is the type of problem 
that this system appears to solve well. In essence, the system seems well-suit-
ed to extract a causal model of the environment’s reward structure, a process 
which is computationally much more data intensive than model-free estimates. 
While the details of the model-based system are just becoming known (Daw et 
al. 2011), it is clear that, like the simple reinforcement-learning system, it relies 
on  dopamine neurons to report a  mismatch between observation and expecta-
tion to drive learning.
Interestingly, the behaviorally expressed values which animal and human 
subjects place on an action with second-order reward contingencies appears to 
be a weighted sum of the model-free and model-based systems. Early in learn-
ing, when little data is available, the model-free system seems to dominate the 
estimate of value expressed behaviorally. As sampling progresses, this shifts, 
and the model-based system makes a larger contribution. Neural data shows a 
similar shift away from the basal ganglia, where the model-free system oper-
ates, to the hippocampus, which is involved in the model-based system (Daw 
2013; Daw and Tobler 2013).
A third learning system (also resident in the basal ganglia) is known as the 
 habit system. This system is similar in many ways to the model-free system, 
but it shows very little plasticity once a certain amount of learning is complete. 
In a typical assay for this system, an animal is trained to produce a behavioral 
response for hundreds of rounds. During initial training, which is dominated by 
the model-free system, subjects are responsive to changes in the environment 
but as this system comes to dominate behavior, the animal becomes unrespon-
sive (or very slowly responsive) to changes in the environment (Dezfouli and 
Balleine 2012). In the language of reinforcement learning, the effective learn-
ing rate drops dramatically as this system comes on line, thus forming a robust 
habit. Recently, the ability to turn this brain area on and off using invasive 
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methods has made it possible for experimenters to engage and disengage the 
habits of their animal subjects at will (Smith and Graybiel 2013).
The fi nal class of learning system is the one that will be most familiar to 
economists: the  declarative- learning system. This  hippocampus-based system 
stores  episodic memories; that is, consciously accessible memories of our lives 
(e.g., the day one’s child walked or the time one was fi rst taught the Slutsky 
equation; Squire and Zola 1996). This system also stores semantic memories; 
that is, nonautobiographical fact-based memories (e.g., the recall of the Slutsky 
equation but not where one learned it).
The most important feature of learning for neurobiologists is that it is ac-
complished by a fi nite set of discrete modules that execute a specifi c set of 
computations. While there are doubtless many of these systems, they are gen-
erally tractable to biological isolation and behavioral categorization. These are 
advantages that empirical approaches to learning may have over more theoreti-
cal approaches, which often fi nd complex learning situations intractable.
Motives
Explaining “why a person in a given situation selects one response over an-
other or makes a given response with greater energization or frequency” is the 
aim  of motivation theory (Bargh et al. 2010:286). In economics, the answer 
usually given to this question is that  rational agents choose actions that satisfy 
their preferences—whatever they might be. By recourse to motivational theo-
ries in behavioral science and psychology, it is possible to add substance and 
to be more specifi c with respect to the preferences (Witt 2008). According to 
these theories, some motivations to act are innate and shared across the higher 
species, including humans. The average strength of these motivations (defi ned 
per suitably chosen period of time) is distributed within the population of a 
species with the usual genetic variance. Some motivations relate to the organ-
isms’ homoeostasis. Examples in humans of such economically relevant bio-
logical motivations are the need for food, clothing, or shelter and the seeking 
of social status. It can be conjectured that the motivation for seeking  social 
status was positively related to survival and reproductive success in ancestral 
times, when these motivations seem to have been genetically fi xed. Yet another 
economically signifi cant motivation that seems to be hardwired is the seeking 
of cognitive or emotional stimulation (or “arousal”).
These motivations—the list could be prolonged—are of interest here, be-
cause their impact is observable in national household expenditure, the variance 
caused by cultural and cognitive infl uences notwithstanding. In this respect, 
they do not differ from other innate behavioral traits whose impact becomes 
visible in the grand total of large populations. A prominent feature of these 
motivational forces is their satiability in terms of pro rata consumption (i.e., 
their declining marginal strength, when the ability to spend on them rises with 
growing income). This feature is expressed by the shape of Engel curves based 
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on aggregate household data. An example of a very robust satiation effect is the 
declining share of food expenditures in all household expenditures. It occurs 
both across income percentiles and over time (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2006); in absolute terms, spending nonetheless continues to rise slightly.
In contrast, the motivation for seeking social status, likely to be one moti-
vational force behind the strongly increasing share of expenditures on housing, 
appears to be diffi cult to satiate as income rises. One reason may be that this 
motivation is tied to a consumer’s relative position, which does not change 
when all consumers in the reference group similarly increase their spending. 
As a consequence, a potentially instable expenditure race can emerge (Frank 
2012). The motivation for seeking stimulation is likely to be one motivational 
force that drives the strongly rising shares of expenditures on entertainment 
and tourism (for the long-term trend in the mentioned expenditure categories 
in the United States, see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006). Again it ap-
pears that little, if any, satiation occurs as the ability to spend increases. In this 
case, however, the reason seems to be a stupefaction process that requires ever 
new stimuli to be obtained from consumption so as not to fall below a certain 
arousal level (Scitovsky 1981).
Culturally contingent parts of the motivation to act are more diffi cult to 
identify. They result from individual conditioning learning and cognitive learn-
ing. Conditioning learning (of reinforcers) is a hardwired phenotypic adapta-
tion mechanism in many higher species and humans. It contributes to survival 
and reproduction success. Refl ecting the infl uence of a lifelong individual 
learning history of human consumers, the motivational forces emerging from 
this kind of learning are likely to contribute substantially to the huge variety 
of, and the idiosyncrasies in, the consumers’ individual expenditure patterns. 
Thus far less is known about the satiability of these motivational forces, but be-
havioral science research seems to point to low or no satiability when income 
rises (Leslie 1996). Something similar holds for the consequences of cognitive 
learning and the acquisition of instrumental consumer knowledge. As long as 
cognitive motives for consumption can be derived from means–ends consider-
ations or exist in their own right (as, e.g., the need for self-esteem), no satiation 
occurs. Producers’ advertising and product information promotion often aim at 
suggesting convincing means–ends relationships in favor of their offers.
Differences in the relative, income-driven satiation of the  consumers’ moti-
vation to spend can explain some of the long-term changes in the composition 
of the household expenditure over periods of strong income growth. Moreover, 
the existence of both innate motivations and culturally contingent motivations 
that, for different reasons, seem to be diffi cult to satiate also explain the secular 
growth of consumer expenditures (Witt 2011). The motivational mechanisms 
preventing satiation are essential for understanding the demand-side dynamics 
for economic growth. They also raise intricate questions.
In market economies, the process of production is ultimately organized to 
serve the satisfaction of consumer preferences and is therefore said to enhance 
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welfare. However, because of the specifi c motivational mechanisms that pre-
vent satiation in the case of the need for seeking social status and the need for 
stimulation, the corresponding growth of expenditures does not increase the 
consumers’ welfare. In terms of satisfying these specifi c preferences, consum-
ers tend to just stay put. Still, the costs of growing consumption in the form 
of resource depletion and  environmental degradation continually increase. 
Further, the culturally contingent motivations emerging from conditioning 
learning and cognitive learning imply preference changes. More specifi cally, 
it is a learning of new preferences by which satiation in the motivation to con-
sume is postponed or offset. When preferences change, a welfare assessment 
of a growing consumption motivated in this way runs into problems. Its out-
come hinges on whether the pre- or the post-learning state of preferences is 
chosen as  reference point. In any case, there will be the environmental costs of 
a growing consumption.
In the language of  evolutionary theory, the hypotheses about the motiva-
tions driving the process of  economic growth raise the following question: If 
the economy is a  complex adaptive system of type 2 (Wilson, this volume), 
what is the criterion of the selection process operating on this system and its 
growth? It does not seem to be the contribution to reproductive success (as it 
used to be during most of human  phylogeny). Nor do the mentioned features of 
innate and culturally conditioned motivations (i.e., of the agents’ preferences) 
seem to support the idea that the criterion is the contribution to human welfare. 
Instead, the secular growth of the use of natural resources suggests a criterion 
that may be conjectured to be valid for all living complex adaptive systems: the 
contribution to raising the throughput of energy and other resources.
Mechanism
The last fi fteen years has seen a revolution in our understanding of the mecha-
nism of human and animal  choice behavior. Just a decade ago, even the most 
basic outlines of the  choice architecture were unknown. Today, neurobiologi-
cal correlates of utility, the maximization underlying the actual making of a 
choice, and even some of the neural mechanisms underlying the anomalous 
choice behaviors identifi ed by behavioral economists are beginning to be un-
derstood mechanistically. Even more exciting is the fact that the combination 
of normative theories of information encoding from neuroscience and norma-
tive theory from economics are yielding new insights at a predictive/positive 
level that may come to be important to  welfare economics (Glimcher 2015). 
Here we review some of the key insights that have emerged over the last decade 
from the new discipline of  neuroeconomics (for further details, see Glimcher, 
this volume and 2011a).
Since Samuelson’s  pioneering work in the early part of this century 
(Samuelson 1947), economists have known that consistent human choosers 
behave exactly “as if” somewhere in their brains, stable values are assigned 
From “Complexity and Evolution: Toward a New Synthesis for Economics,” 
David S. Wilson and Alan Kirman, eds. 2016. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 19, 
series ed. J. Lupp. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-03538-5. 
 
130 T. C. Burnham et al. 
to any option that lies within a (feasible) choice set, and that these subjects 
behave exactly “as if” choice was the process of selecting the element (from 
this choice set) that has the highest numerical value (Friedman and Savage 
1948; Mas-Colell et al. 1995). While real human choice is at times inconsistent 
(e.g., Allais 1953), a group of neuroeconomists began their work by searching 
for the physical instantiation of utility, and for a mechanism that can select 
from a physical representation of option utilities the option that has the highest 
numerical value.
Real success was achieved about fi ve years ago, when a pair of brain areas 
were identifi ed which had activity patterns linearly correlated with behavior-
ally inferred utility (Levy and Glimcher 2012; Bartra et al. 2013). In these two 
areas, brain activity (which is a physically measurable quantity, and hence a 
unique and fully cardinal object), is now often referred to as encoding “subjec-
tive value.” Subjective value (as represented in the  medial prefrontal cortex 
and  ventral striatum) can be used to predict choice (Levy and Glimcher 2012). 
In fact, when humans behave in an inconsistent manner (e.g., because of local 
context effects), activity in these brain areas still predicts choice accurately 
(Kable and Glimcher 2007).
At a more biophysical level, studies have started to explain the process of 
 selection among alternatives (Webb et al. 2014). Models of interneuron com-
petition constructed at the level of a couple nonlinear differential equations 
have begun to reveal the dynamics of this process (LoFaro et al. 2014) and to 
give insight into how choice operates mechanistically.
Of course if choice begins mechanistically with a representation of subjec-
tive value, it is critical to understand how these subjective values are learned 
or aggregated. A great deal of success has been achieved in studying the neural 
mechanisms of learning; at least half a dozen such mechanisms have now been 
identifi ed and at least partially characterized (see Daw 2013; Daw and Tobler 
2013). The key point is that mechanisms exist by which the desirability of ac-
tions and rewards can be sampled from the environment and used to establish 
or modify subjective values.
A fi nal critical point to make in this domain is that one should not draw 
the conclusion that the architecture for choice is monolithic. At each stage of 
the process, multiple mechanisms cooperate to yield each component in the 
choice process. For example, many different brain areas, each with unique 
specializations, combine to set subjective  values (Bartra et al. 2013). Multiple 
interlocked systems represent those aggregated subjective values, and several 
mechanisms appear to converge the selection process (Glimcher 2015; Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad 2006), also in an interlocked manner. For these reasons, 
it is important not to think of any stage of the process as refl ecting the prefer-
ences of a single module or actor. It is more accurate to think of the individual 
human as aggregating specialized components—an aggregation that may soon 
begin to explain some of the inconsistencies we, as a culture of scholars, see 
in human behavior.
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Modularity
While there has historically been variation in the use of the term, in some com-
munities “ modularity” has come to refer to the extent to which a mechanism 
is functionally specialized (Barrett and Kurzban 2006). It was introduced into 
broad use within cognitive science by Fodor (1983), who concluded that while 
some systems in the mind (e.g., sensory systems) were modular, according to 
his use of the term, others were not. This conclusion rested on the idea that the 
extent to which a given system was modular depended on how many proper-
ties, which Fodor associated with modularity (e.g., automaticity, fast opera-
tion), the system in question had.
In current use, the issue is less about how many of the properties that Fodor 
associated with modularity a given system possesses, and more of a guide for 
investigation. Present conceptions of modularity focus attention on the empiri-
cal question how modular, or functionally specialized, a putative mechanism 
is. This approach follows the suggestion that modularity was not an all-or-none 
property, but a property that a computational system can have to a greater or 
lesser degree (Fodor 1983).
To take one example from a well-understood model, consider the visual 
system. The front end of the visual system consists of photoreceptors, which 
are sensitive to the presence of light, and fi re depending on the wavelength of 
light that hits them. Their function is to detect light and send information about 
its presence downstream in the visual system. Photoreceptors are modular in 
the sense that they are specialized to detect light and signal its presence. The 
visual system, more generally, is specialized as well, designed to use incom-
ing light, as well as knowledge in the rest of the brain, to construct an image 
of the outside world, which can then be used to identify objects, plan motion, 
and so forth.
A potentially important feature of modular systems is that they can be 
“walled off” from other systems. (Fodor used the term “informationally en-
capsulated” to refer to this property.) To return to the example of the  visual 
system, consider the Müller-Lyer optical illusion (Figure 8.1), to which many, 
but not all, people are susceptible (for further details, see Henrich et al. 2010). 
If one disregards the arrowheads or fi ns at the end of these lines, are the lines 
the same length or is one longer?
The two horizontal lines in Müller-Lyer image are the same length. Even 
after subjects are told that the two lines in the image are identical, and allowed 
Figure 8.1 The  Müller-Lyer illusion.
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to verify this by measurement, the lines continue to be perceived as unequal. 
Knowledge of their equality does not affect that  visual system; the visual rep-
resentation is “walled off” from the relevant propositional knowledge.
Some have argued that most of the systems in the mind are modular to an 
interesting extent (Kurzban 2010). In the context of our discussion here, this 
might have signifi cant implications for decision making, including in econom-
ic contexts. For example, the modular view suggests that different modules 
are dynamically activated and deactivated depending on context and state. For 
instance, when organisms are hungry, their “food-seeking” modules might be 
more likely to motivate food-seeking behavior, simultaneously inhibiting other 
kinds of motives. In this way, modular systems can be thought of as animating 
the trade-offs that organisms must make in decision making.
A second implication of modularity resonates with “ multiple selves” mod-
els (e.g., Ainslie 1992) under development. If the mind is modular and there 
are a large number of specialized systems operating simultaneously, to some 
extent “walled off” from one another, then people might not always be profi t-
ably conceptualized as unitary, with beliefs and preferences that can be thought 
of as associated with the person as a whole. In that case, it might be sensible 
to consider that different parts of the brain might contain different (possibly 
confl icting) beliefs. Such an architecture might not resonate with models that 
understand agents, as a whole, to have “beliefs” and “preferences.”
More generally, an implication of modularity is that there might be incon-
sistencies in the mind. As illustrated by the  Müller-Lyer illusion, there might be 
other domains in which there are contradictory beliefs (representations) in the 
mind. For instance, one way to understand “self-deception” is that there is one 
representation that is (more or less) the “true” belief, and one that people com-
municate to others (Trivers 2000). This view implies that there is no one true 
unitary agent in the mind. Such a view diverges from some conceptions of eco-
nomic agents and could have implications for thinking about decision making.
Mismatch
Evolutionary  mismatch exists when an organism is “out of sync” with its en-
vironment in some signifi cant fashion. Because behavior is produced by spe-
cifi c mechanisms, mismatch can create puzzling, self-destructive, or otherwise 
aberrant behavior in particular environments (Bowlby 1969; Burnham 2013; 
Irons 1998; Tooby and Cosmides 1992). It is diffi cult to think about mismatch 
except from an evolutionary perspective.
Mismatch can be viewed using  Tinbergen’s four questions (discussed ear-
lier). In particular, mismatch and Tinbergen may be particularly important for 
explaining non-maximizing or other puzzling behavior. Survival  value, one of 
Tinbergen’s four questions, argues that  natural selection favors optimizing be-
havior. For example, in the case of diet (explored below), survival value argues 
that organisms will eat foods that are good for them. However, the selective 
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pressure to behave optimally is constrained by Tinbergen’s other three ques-
tions. Mechanisms to produce behavior evolve over evolutionary time and are 
constrained by  ontogeny and  phylogeny.
A central concept is the idea of an  ancestral environment, which may have 
varied in many ways, but where important relationships remained relatively 
constant for many generations—enough for evolution to move the population 
toward local maxima.
The developmental psychologist John Bowlby coined the term environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness as “the one that man inhabited for two million 
years until changes of the past few thousand years led to the extraordinary 
variety of habitats he occupies today....Just as  Darwin found it impossible to 
understand the structure of an orchid fl ower until he knew what insects fl our-
ished and visited it in its environment of adaptedness...we need to turn to an-
thropological studies of human communities...and fi eld studies of the higher 
primates” (Bowlby 1969:59, 61).
Organisms that exist in novel environments can suffer or exhibit anomalous 
behavior, because their physiologic mechanisms produce different outcomes in 
the current environment than they did in the ancestral environment. In humans, 
one example of mismatch is cretinism, a condition of severely stunted men-
tal and physical growth caused by  hypothyroidism. Some populations in the 
Himalayas have cretinism rates of over 10% due to iodine-defi cient hypothy-
roidism. This is a poignant example of the cost of mismatch. (Iodine injections 
prevent cretinism in this population as readily as limes prevent scurvy.) The 
mismatch explanation for cretinism is that the human ancestral world people 
absorbed suffi cient iodine without any behavior directed toward its acquisi-
tion. In many parts of the world, the baseline iodine levels are high enough 
that suffi cient quantities are absorbed as a part of other activities. Cretinism 
occurs when humans move to geographic areas with particularly low levels of 
iodine (Delange 1994; Ibbertson et al. 1972). The high prevalence of goiter in 
Derbyshire, U.K. is sometimes attributed to mismatch, although this case is not 
settled (Saikat et al. 2004).
Another example is the idea that people’s dietary tastes produce morbidity 
and mortality. This was articulated by William Irons (1998:197):
It is hypothesized that in ancestral environments these preferences motivated 
people to come as close as their circumstances allowed to optimal diets. However 
in modern environments, the abundance of different types of foods is vastly dif-
ferent, and these preferences often motivate people to choose diets that are much 
less healthy than are possible in their circumstances.
To further elucidate this thinking, consider how economics addresses  prefer-
ences toward meat, bread, and high-fructose sugar. In standard economic mod-
els, these three foods are treated equivalently; people have preferences and 
make choices consistent with those preferences. An evolutionary perspective 
suggests that the time depth of a type of food, or, more generally, an economic 
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good, might be part of the evaluation. Humans are argued to have been meat 
eaters for many thousands of generations, to have had signifi cant access to 
carbohydrates such as bread since the invention of  agriculture, and to have had 
much less access to high-fructose sugar (Lucock et al. 2014). The evolutionary 
suggestion is that human genes and cultures are less likely to have had time to 
adjust to bread and high-fructose sugar than to meat (for meat, however, it is 
likely that ancestral meat was leaner than that which is available today).
What are the implications of mismatch for economics? Our  preferences can 
lead us to behaviors that are suboptimal; we do what we like and the outcome 
is “bad.” Bad can have three overlapping meanings. First, the outcome can 
lead to disease and death, or it can simply be less desired than another feasible 
outcome. Second, our preferences can result in behaviors that lead to internal 
confl ict. For example, it has been suggested that humans are natural savers via 
body fat. If this is true, then human preferences over fi nancial savings instru-
ments might lead humans to save systematically too much or too little, where 
“too much” or “too little” is defi ned from the perspective of other parts of the 
brain (Burnham and Phelan 2000). Overspending, for example, might cause in-
ternal confl ict. Third, our mismatched preferences can impose costs on others 
(e.g., drug addiction). These costs can be addressed via conventional methods 
to align public and private payoffs (e.g, education, sanctions,  taxes). However, 
a mismatch view can suggest likely areas for policy intervention. For example, 
trans fats are argued to be a particularly problematic type of food as they pos-
sess a dangerous set of attributes:
• Trans fats are not distinguished by most humans from other fats.
• Trans fats are cheaper to use.
• Trans fats are bad for health.
Thus, without some form of policy intervention, people might be likely to 
overconsume trans fats from both their own perspective and that of the society. 
In addition, those who produce foods containing trans fats have a strong incen-
tive to encourage their consumption.
The mismatch perspective suggests that evolutionary history has impor-
tance both for economic theory and for public policy.
Objective Function
Given a defi ned ecology, an organism is assumed to make decisions that result 
in an  inclusive  fi tness measure. It is often convenient to provide a proximate 
problem of choosing a strategy to maximize (or minimize) an objective func-
tion subject to resource constraints. Strategies, in turn, are mappings from in-
formation sets into actions. The action chosen is often called the decision of the 
organism. Decisions produce outcomes for the organism which may increase 
or decrease its inclusive fi tness. Selection pressures may change the  objective 
function that is maximized, the strategy space available to the organism, the 
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mechanisms for choosing strategies, and the mechanisms for converting strate-
gies into actions. Sometimes a shortcut is used to look at selection as acting on 
the choice of strategy used by the organism.
Several extensions are made. First, to what extent does the  objective func-
tion and strategy space anticipate the possibility that the ecology may change 
over the organism’s lifetime or adaptive cycle? This may include systematic 
or random changes in resources. Second, to what extent does the organism 
have to anticipate the strategies/actions of other organisms? This results in the 
choice of competitive or cooperative strategies and the formation of beliefs 
(naïve or sophisticated) about others. Third, to what extent does the organism 
plan? A plan is a strategy that chooses a contingent path of decisions. Here, 
the organism tries to solve a stochastic dynamic programming problem to de-
termine its strategy. In solving this problem the organism must form beliefs 
(either naïve or sophisticated) about future states of the world.
The Origins of Choice
The many cases  of mismatch show that simply identifying behaviors (or out-
comes) as adaptive (or not) is insuffi cient to predict whether they will be cho-
sen. Only if there have been appropriate selective pressures operating during 
the organism’s evolutionary history is it likely that there will be a mechanism 
for making the choice that will enhance the organism’s fi tness; if those pres-
sures are no longer operating, the choices made may no longer be fi tness en-
hancing. In addition, all of this assumes that the animal has the perceptual and 
cognitive apparatus to make the choices in which we are interested.
While fossils rarely, if ever, reveal the preferences or choices of our ances-
tors, we can make estimates of how old particular tendencies are by inves-
tigating whether they are found in our near relatives. If the human taste for 
the sweetest substances available is shared by all, or nearly all, Old World 
primates, this preference is probably at least 25 million years old (and could be 
older). If it is shared only by the great apes, the preference is probably no more 
than 20 million years old (and could even be more recent). It is a reasonable 
guess that the older a preference, the harder it will be to overcome.
The second issue raised by our evolutionary history is the kinds of learn-
ing mechanism available. As noted above, there are at least four distinguish-
able kinds of learning (the literature of comparative cognition would recognize 
many others, or divide our four categories into many subsets). Consider, for 
example, the special kinds of learning shown by a songbird or a long-distance 
migrant, or the  social  learning that enables capuchins to acquire tool use or 
meerkats to deal safely with scorpions. We want to focus, however, on two 
particular categories of  learning, because the distinction between them has 
important implications for what we might put in a complex theory of human 
economic behavior.
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As far as is known, what we have termed “model-free”  reinforcement 
 learning seems to be shared with all vertebrates, and it has been shown to be 
shared with some invertebrates, many insects (e.g., ants, bees of various spe-
cies, cockroaches), other arthropods (e.g., spiders), some mollusks (including 
slugs and snails), and various cephalopods. The most contested question may 
be whether it extends to humans. Associative learning (which includes both 
model-free and model-based reinforcement learning) can certainly be demon-
strated in humans, but distinguishing model-free and model-based learning by 
behavioral means alone is tricky. (For a summary of early behavioral work, 
which demonstrated the necessity to include a mental model in the explanation 
of rats’ associative learning, see Dickinson 1981.)
The reason that  associative  learning is diffi cult to study in humans is the 
pervasive human tendency to use a different learning mechanism to solve 
choice problems, namely  declarative  learning or  rule-governed behavior 
(Skinner 1969, chapter 6). In the majority of cases, this dominates any associa-
tive processes (e.g., McLaren et al. 2014). The rules or propositions people 
use to control their choices may be of many types and may come from many 
sources: from a personal calculation to a social norm. A particularly impor-
tant type, however, are those which derive from what Tulving (2001) called 
“ autonoëtic consciousness”: the ability to play out, in one’s imagination, past 
or future events so as to, test possible responses to a situation, predict their 
consequences, and use those predictions to guide a decision. When autonoëtic 
consciousness is applied to the past, we call it  episodic memory; when applied 
to the future, it is called episodic future thought. Suddendorf and Corballis 
(1997) refer to these processes as “ mental time travel,” and argue strongly that 
they are unique to humans—an argument that experimentalists have been as-
saulting ever since, as we now explain.
It is fairly well established that a range of animal species can show what 
is generally referred to as “episodic-like” memory, demonstrating a recall of 
what happened, when it happened, and where it happened. This is most easily 
demonstrated in animals specialized for scatter-hoarding: the earliest evidence 
came from scrub jays (Clayton and Dickinson 1998), and was followed by 
demonstrations in chickadees (Feeney et al. 2009). This has also been demon-
strated in other species using different models: in mate selection by meadow 
voles (Ferkin et al. 2008), spatial food search by rats (Babb and Crystal 2005), 
and matching to sample in rhesus monkeys (Hoffman et al. 2009). What re-
mains unclear is whether these episodic-like memory phenomena represent 
the kind of declarative process that would enable animals other than humans 
to engage in rule-governed decision making. Direct comparisons between hu-
mans and animals, like pigeons, in tasks where human choices are typically 
rule-governed reveal unsurprisingly massive species differences. For example, 
gray squirrels, which as scatter-hoarders might be expected to have episodic-
like memory available, reportedly behaved more like pigeons rather than hu-
mans (Wills et al. 2009).
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From the point of view of animal choice, perhaps the most important ques-
tion is whether animals other than humans can imagine the outcomes of a 
choice and behave in the light of those imagined outcomes. Currently there 
is a lively research area on  planning in animals that focuses on nonhuman 
primates, with clear claims from laboratory experiments that planning can be 
demonstrated in chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys (Beran et al. 2004; Mulcahy 
and Call 2006) as well as in capuchins (Beran and Parrish 2012). This distri-
bution suggests that a considerable number of primate species should show 
the ability. Field data on route selection while foraging have also been inter-
preted as indicating planning in, for example, chimpanzees (Ban et al. 2014), 
although apparently not to any signifi cant extent in baboons (Noser and Byrne 
2010). Planning, however, may not be available for all tasks, even in chimpan-
zees (Dufour and Sterck 2008).
While the evidence for planning in animals is not yet fully robust, it is 
strongly suggestive. In the context of this Forum, what this means is that  de-
clarative  learning and rule-governed decision making may be phylogenetically 
quite ancient, and specifi cally more ancient than human language. It is beyond 
question that a complex model of human economic choice, and therefore of the 
economy, needs to include the possibility of rule-governed decision making. 
If, however,  rule-governed behavior can be found in nonhuman animals, as the 
data now suggest, it follows that such behavior can occur without the interven-
tion of  language. Therefore, in humans, it is possible that there may be kinds 
of rule-governed behavior that are resistant to linguistic probing, or indeed to 
alteration by linguistic argument.
Conation
One of the most striking departures of human choice from rational models 
occurs in intertemporal choice (i.e., choice between outcomes that occur at 
different points in future time). Humans are much more present-oriented than 
seems sensible, and to make observed choices fi t with a rational choice model, 
absurdly high discounting rates have to be postulated (e.g., 33% per annum; 
Friedman 1957). This excessive present orientation is frequently attributed to 
“weakness of will” (a phrase particularly used in philosophical psychology) or 
“lack of  self-control.” It has been argued (e.g., Ainslie 1975) that it arises be-
cause future outcomes are discounted according to a hyperbolic function rather 
than to the exponential function required for standard  rationality approaches. 
Reconciling hyperbolic discounting with any version of the rational actor 
model is diffi cult. The hyperbolic discounting model derives ultimately from 
experiments with rats and pigeons, which aimed to produce a nonrational posi-
tive theory of choice (e.g., Herrnstein 1970; Mazur 1984). When we compare 
human choice with these kinds of animal choice, it turns out that the question 
is not why humans are so bad at intertemporal choice, but rather why we are so 
(relatively) good at it (Lea 2014). Furthermore, the most recent experimental 
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economic evidence suggests that exponential discounting may fi t large-scale 
data quite well, and with more reasonable discount rates than had been previ-
ously thought (on the order of 9%; Andersen et al. 2014). However, it remains 
true, as Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and many other behavioral economists 
argue, that an empirically based model of the human economic agent needs to 
incorporate both discount rates and discount functions that would not be pre-
dicted by the  rational actor theory.
Toward an Evolutionary Behavioral Economics
Implications for Economic Theory
So what kind of modifi cation in economic thinking do we need? There are two 
possibilities, a gradualist and a radical approach, and there were members of 
the group who argued for each.
Under the gradualist approach, work would go forward using the standard 
or rational actor model, informed, however, by what we know about the way 
humans make decisions to modify the inputs and parameters that the model 
requires. In broad terms, this is how economics, as a discipline, has respond-
ed to the challenge from behavioral economics, at least since Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) original paper on  prospect theory. As a result of this work, the 
status of the rational actor model has been clarifi ed. Behavioral economics has 
repeatedly shown over the last few decades that individuals act inconsistently, 
make choices that incur costs on them but may benefi t others, use  rules of 
thumb and other  heuristics, and are prone to a range of biases. Both economists 
and psychologists who have thought about the theoretical foundations of such 
behavior have, in most cases, responded by modifying  the existing framework 
of utility maximization, for example by introducing additional elements into 
a utility function (e.g., identity concerns, social  norms, inequality aversion) or 
adding additional parameters to the utility function (e.g., the “beta” of hyper-
bolic discounting). However, in such cases, it is not always clear whether the 
proposed utility functions are thought of as reasonable descriptive approxima-
tions of observed behavioral phenomena (as-if propositions in the Friedman 
sense), or whether those utility functions are derived from observed consisten-
cies of human choice behavior (as-if propositions in the sense that consistent 
observed choices are equivalent to preferences). Given that most economists 
subscribe to the view that economics should be based on behavioral and ob-
servable data, the second as-if sense should be preferred, but bizarrely, very of-
ten proposed models do not live up to this view. Hence, very generally speak-
ing, one way forward would be to clarify such methodological issues and to 
see how far consistent behavior should be or can be the basis of economic 
models in the light of empirical and behavioral evidence of inconsistent be-
havior. Would it suffi ce to weaken consistency axioms to allow for a broader 
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range of behavior (e.g., Arlegi and Teschl 2015)? Related to this is also the 
issue of whether it is desirable to maintain the idea of maximization or whether 
other choice rules should be considered as well (e.g., Baigent and Gaertner 
1996; Gaertner and Xu 1999). What is clear, however, is that an evolutionary 
approach to economics leads to many different emphases from a conventional 
one, as is shown in Table 5.1 (see Axtell et al., this volume). If we are to use 
the rational actor model in an evolutionary context, we need to honor as many 
of those differences as we can.
The more radical alternative is to discard entirely the standard or rational 
actor model central to existing economic approaches to understanding human 
nature. It is no good advocating such an approach without specifying what 
might be put in its place. One way to formulate a new model, advocated by 
some members of our group, is to build empirically derived multi-agent mod-
els without any of notion of rational actors or maximization. It is perfectly 
possible to construct multi-agent models of specifi c economic behaviors with-
out explicitly imposing a rational actor model. This has been done by Gintis 
(2007), a paper that has served as a model for many multi-agent models of real 
systems (e.g., model of economic convergence within the European Union; 
Dawid et al. 2014). To represent the full spectrum of economic behavior, this 
type of model requires a great deal of knowledge about the agents (e.g., their 
 motives, their stored information about the world, their learning mechanisms). 
It also requires us to know how agents relate to one another (e.g., their social 
interactions, the different levels of power and infl uence they are able to wield). 
Here the voluminous literature on social network analysis should be helpful 
(Burt et al. 2013). To put it another way, theory-building would have to depend 
on a detailed knowledge of the natural history of economic behavior.
In this context, we note that it is normal in economics and game theory to 
treat the ontology of decision making as utilitarian. Other fi elds, however, in-
vestigate a wide variety of ontologies of human decisions. One such ontology 
involves deontic logic, which attempts to formalize notions of what is permis-
sible, omissible, impermissible, obligatory, and optional, among other things. 
Deontic logic is a kind of modal logic and can be axiomatized using standard 
modal logic. Specifi cally, using suitable  Kripke structures, a logic known as 
KD45 has come to be known as standard deontic logic and has been widely 
used, for example, in multi-agent systems, from computer science to animate 
agents. This logic seems especially powerful for modeling certain kinds of 
ideologically motivated, adversarial agents, who take actions predominantly 
on the basis of what they perceive as the “right” thing to do. Concepts such 
as norms, conventions, and institutions, which tend to be ephemeral and con-
tingent in a utilitarian ontology, arise naturally in a deontic ontology, and it is 
partially for this reason that they have found use in models where the forma-
tion and evolution of norms is important.
Whichever approach one may want to take (and our two proposed ap-
proaches are certainly not all there is to understanding and modeling human 
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behavior), we would like to repeat the cautionary note we raised earlier: As a 
species, we face urgent concerns, and perhaps even an emergency.
One of the most obvious of evolutionary facts is that the human niche has 
expanded over time. The human imprint on the planet—as measured by pop-
ulation, biomass, carbon dioxide emissions, or simply GDP—has expanded 
enormously since the invention of agriculture.
If one is concerned about the human imprint on the planet, and in particular, 
a need to alter the trajectory of that imprint, then is it reasonable to ask what 
the  rational actor model has to contribute to addressing this problem. The short 
answer is: very little. By analogy to standard price theory, economics has a 
usable theory of how people respond to price or income changes, but it does 
not provide a deep understanding of the drivers of those responses. In short, 
economics classifi es the behavior, but does not explain it. We believe it is im-
portant to explain why the economy is growing, and how we can change its 
trajectory before something “bad” happens (e.g., as a result of overpopulation, 
more extreme global warming). This requires us to understand the nature of 
tastes, which the rational actor model regards as beyond investigation. We can 
use  evolutionary theory to inform economics about how humans have increas-
ingly come to dominate our environment. It is the desire to understand the 
origin and nature of tastes that leads to our investigation into motivation. We 
feel it is insuffi cient to agnostically catalog the types of human consumption. 
Success in understanding, and even survival, may depend on our ability to un-
derstand, at a much fi ner level, what desires satiate, and at what levels.
Progress on these fronts may allow economics to achieve a reconciliation 
with environmentalism. Environmentalists often make normative arguments; 
at present, they often do so without engaging actual evolved human nature, 
but that is not inherent in their approach (Lea 2001). Given the current state 
of economics, environmentalists may have no alternative to such approaches.
One important conceptual topic is to understand where selection is working. 
In the framework of Wilson (this volume), is human society a CAS1 or  CAS2 
system? Is there any reason to believe that the overall system is subject to se-
lection, or should we view individuals or groups of individuals, but not the en-
tire population of the planet, as the  unit of selection? Beyond categorizing hu-
man society as CAS1 or CAS2, understanding the processes of selection might 
offer a novel and better way of understanding human motivation. Selection 
takes place at multiple levels. One of these levels is the group. Within groups, 
individuals have to follow the “rules of the game.”
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (2000) classify evolution according to  ma-
jor transitions that have occurred in the encoding of information. Such encod-
ing allows selection to operate on strategies and mechanisms. They argue that 
the last transition for humans is evidenced by the emergence of language and 
symbolic manipulation. This created a capacity for forming, and possibly ad-
hering to, institutional rules.
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Humans are unique in their capacity to create and follow the rules of a 
game and thus can be characterized as  H. ludens (Gintis, this volume). The 
capacity to follow rules is essential for the creation of institutions. Through 
 cultural evolution, some  institutions are selected while others are not. What 
can this selection of institutions tell us about human motivation and the change 
of motivation over time? The human ability to manipulate the rules of games 
presumably plays a central role in the explosion of human population and the 
consequent impact of our species on the planet. Is it possible to alter the rules 
in some way to improve our current trajectory?
Implications for Behavioral Public Policy
The infl uence of behavioral economists on  public policy has increased over 
the last decade. Based on the insight that choices are often infl uenced by the 
context  in which decisions take place (Kahneman 2011), policy makers have 
begun to “nudge” individuals to make certain decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008). Nudges are defi ned as intentional changes of the “ choice architecture” 
that affect the behavior of humans; they do not, however, affect the behavior 
of rationally deciding H.  economicus. For example, default rules have at most 
a small infl uence on the behavior of rational individuals, but a strong effect 
on the behavior of humans in the domains of energy consumption and organ 
donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Sunstein 2014). Also, providing in-
dividuals with information about what other people do (i.e., communicating 
social norms) can have large effects on individual choices (Schultz et al. 2007).
The analysis of behavioral, nudge-like interventions has focused on the im-
mediate effects on the nudged individuals. Other aspects of nudges have re-
ceived limited attention. For example, we often do not know much about the 
mechanisms that explain why nudges are effective, nor whether applied nudg-
ers are interested in these mechanisms. We have very little knowledge about 
how behavioral interventions change behavior over time. We know nothing 
about  unintended consequences of behavioral interventions, which might un-
fold at higher levels of aggregation, affecting the adaptiveness of groups rather 
than individuals. The evolutionary approach that we suggest in this paper can 
contribute to a better understanding of the opportunities and dangers of behav-
ioral interventions. Below we list three areas where evolutionary behavioral 
economics can be of value for behavioral policy making.
First, evolutionary insights can improve the effectiveness of behavioral 
interventions. The analysis of evolutionary mismatch (discussed above) can 
provide ultimate explanations of the mechanisms that explain why nudges are 
particularly effective in certain domains. For example, nudges to encourage 
a healthy diet might be designed more effectively when acknowledging that 
human genes had less time to adjust to high-fructose sugar than to bread and 
meat. Nature might not have had the time to develop a healthy satiation dy-
namic for high-fructose sugar (see section on Motives). The modular view 
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(as described in the section on Modularity), suggests that nudges can change 
decision contexts to activate certain modules in the brain that interact with 
inner states (e.g., hunger). A nudge might activate a module to think of future 
consequences (call it “ mental time travel” or “ autonoëtic consciousness”; see 
section on Phylogeny) when organisms are hungry to avoid unhealthy eating. 
More generally, a better understanding of human motivations and how they 
differ from each other (see sections on Motives and, for money as a particu-
larly motivating reward, Money) can help predict in which domains nudges 
will be successful (Lades 2014).
Second, the evolutionary economic focus on understanding the changes of 
tastes, preferences, and beliefs can help us better understand long-run effects 
of behavioral interventions. Since actions are not only driven by  preferences, 
but also create or change preferences (Ariely and Norton 2008), nudges can af-
fect preference-learning dynamics. While the behavioral one-shot perspective 
neglects these dynamics, the evolutionary approach advocated in this chap-
ter focuses on long-term changes of what individuals want “in general.” This 
long-term change might be much more important than short-term fl uctuations 
of what individuals want when “infl uenced by the context.”
Whether and how nudges affect preference-learning dynamics depends on 
the learning mechanism at play (see sections on Learning as well as Phylogeny). 
Since nudges work best in the absence of awareness (Bovens 2013), they might 
infl uence preference dynamics via  associative- learning mechanisms that are 
not necessarily accessible by verbal inquiry. Whether nudges can also infl uence 
 declarative  learning has yet to be established. Nudges can also affect social-
learning mechanisms as described in cultural evolutionary theory (see section 
on Social Learning/Cultural Evolution). Cultural evolutionary theory provides a 
tool to analyze the long-term effects of social nudges (e.g., social norm interven-
tions) on preference dynamics via biased-learning strategies in groups.
Understanding human motivations and their different degrees of satiability 
can also  be useful for predicting long-run effects of nudges: Nudges that relate 
to motivations which are diffi cult to be satiated (e.g., status seeking, seeking 
stimulation and arousal) might induce different learning dynamics than nudges 
which encourage behavior that satisfi es satiable motivations. In particular, the 
role of nudges to foster or impede our seemingly insatiable desire for  money 
warrants a dynamic analysis.
Finally,  multilevel selection models combined with  complexity theory might 
inform us about the effects of changed individual behavior for the success of 
groups. Group success might feed back to the individual level and change in-
dividual behavior. Nudges in the spirit of libertarian  paternalism (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008) try to improve individual decisions to make individuals better 
off, and thus promote individual adaptiveness. Nudges that are not in the spirit 
of libertarian  paternalism try to encourage behavior that is costly for the indi-
vidual but benefi cial for the group (Sunstein 2014). An evolutionary multilevel 
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selection model could provide some information about which type of nudge 
makes individuals better off in the long run.
It is crucial to acknowledge the normative aspects of an evolutionary be-
havioral economics of behavioral interventions. Nudges are often criticized 
for being paternalistic and manipulative (Sunstein 2014). The evolutionary ap-
proach generates new arguments in this debate. The discussion of  modularity, 
for example, suggests that there might not be a true, unitary agent in the mind 
(Lea and Webley 2005). This generates a problem for libertarian  paternalism 
and its aim to encourage decisions that make individuals better off, as judged 
by themselves (Thaler and Sunstein 2008:5). If there are multiple agents in 
the mind, which one determines what makes the individual better off? Also, 
if behavioral interventions aim to change preference-learning dynamics, the 
normative discussion about the “ethics of nudge” has to be expanded to include 
long-term changes of tastes, preferences, and beliefs (Binder and Lades 2015). 
Discussion is needed as to whether nudges that affect preference-learning 
paths are normatively acceptable. Finally, it is important to discuss whether 
policy interventions which encourage group benefi cial behavior, but are costly 
for the individual, are normatively acceptable. More generally, should “nudg-
ing” be part of public policy making at all. There is a similar debate about 
whether  governments should take care of people’s “happiness” and conceive 
policies to enhance people’s well-being in terms of happiness. Many scholars 
actually argue against it, with reference to abuses of power and incentives to 
manipulate any happiness index to the governments’ own advantage (Frey and 
Gallus 2013). Similar criticism can be applied to governments’ nudging people 
to do the right or better thing, especially in cases where there may not be a 
univocally best option to choose or to do.
Clearly, people should not be deprived of their own decision power and 
understanding of themselves. Economics has always cherished the idea of con-
sumer sovereignty, and it is the view of many economists and other scientists 
that this value should be maintained. The alternative to nudging is individual 
responsibility (Sugden 2004, 2007). As Sugden shows, if responsibility is an 
accepted normative disposition, then what matters in determining whether a 
situation is “better” than another are more opportunities, even the opportunities 
to make bad choices. Clearly, this opportunity–responsibility approach needs 
to be evaluated from an evolutionary and complexity perspective to see in 
how far it would fare better than alternative policies in succeeding to provide 
and maintain a sustainable way of life. Another perspective of public policy is 
given by Colander and Kupers (2014). As a viable solution for policy making, 
they propose a combination of government and market mechanisms.
Whatever the approach to public policy making, it seems clear that people 
have to become aware that to a large extent, their behavior is on many occa-
sions “out of sync” with the kind of behavior needed to save and protect the 
natural environment, and thus their own lives. Not only should the current 
model of choice and economic behavior be revised to take account of the huge 
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amount of experimental and behavioral evidence that people do not behave as 
the standard economic model presupposes, responsible agents (whether they 
act as consumers, producers, service providers, government agents, activists, 
etc.) need to endorse  Tinbergen’s four questions and be inquisitive about how 
behavior occurs and why it occurs as it does—and to use this knowledge to 
change purposefully any future behavior.
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